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Abstract
Two studies were conducted to examine influences on juror decision-making in a mock 
jury task. The order of presentation and strength of arguments for the prosecution and 
defense were manipulated to test for primacy and recency effects. Assessment of each 
juror’s need for cognition was conducted in order to identify individual differences that 
may underlie the observed effects of order of presentations and argument strength. 
Experiment 1 employed a hypothetical court case involving a stabbing. Two-hundred and 
twenty four subjects participated. Results from an ANOVA and a logistic regression 
revealed that the strength of the prosecution’s arguments had a significant influence on 
juror’s verdict. Furthermore, when assessing the results of the culpability scale, individuals 
low in need for cognition were more prone to an order effect, whereas those high in need 
for cognition based their decision on the strength of the arguments presented rather than 
the order of presentations. In addition to assessing individual’s need for cognition. 
Experiment 2 examined juror’s ability through the manipulation of complex and 
simplified expert testimonies. Two-hundred and eighty eight subjects participated. A 
simulated criminal case involving a murder was employed. Results of a logistic 
regression showed strength of arguments had a significant influence on jurors’ verdicts. 
Individuals low in need for cognition were more affected by defense’s expert testimony, 
whereas those individuals high in need for cognition were relatively unaffected by the 
complexity of the testimonies. Some of these findings are consistent with previous 
research and may be important factors when determining courtroom persuasion.
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Factors Influencing Juror Decision-Making in a Mock Jury Trial:
Examining the Role of Need for Cognition in Primacy and Recency Effects 
Personality and social psychologists have found that differences in persuasion 
variables and processes are responsible for inducing attitude change.' Early in the 1950s 
Hovland and his colleagues at Yale developed the message-learning approach by 
examining how different variables affected a person’s attention to, comprehension of, 
yielding to, and retention of the arguments in a persuasive message (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). Since then, many theories have been developed on the role of personality factors 
and other variables in persuasion (e.g., The Heuristic Systematic Model, Chakien, 1980; 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). These various theoretical 
approaches to persuasion can be applied to many forms of persuasive communication in 
several settings. For example, research in the areas of multimedia presentations (e.g., 
audio, video and animation; Ottinger, 1993), consumer research (e.g., Evans, 1989; 
Friestad & Wright, 1995) and education (e.g., Clark, 2002) have all attempted to identify 
persuasion variables relevant to their setting. However in terms of consequences, 
persuasion techniques used in a criminal jury trial can have a profound affect on the 
outcome of the case. The success of the crown’s case and the fate of the defendant lie 
upon the juror’s responses to the testimony, arguments and evidence conveyed to them by 
the prosecution and defense (Stone, 1969).
The decision-making task faced by jurors has received more attention from social 
and behavioural scientists than any other comparable judgment task in our society 
(Hastie, 1993). Hastie has identified several reasons for exploring jurors’ judgments in
’ A persuasion variable can be defined as any factor (e.g., source credibility, attractiveness, strength of 
arguments etc.) which influences the formation or change of an attitude.
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studies of decision-making. However, the most notable causes are that the task is 
complex, isolated from external social influences and primarily based upon the level to 
which jurors process the materials presented in court. The latter is believed to be 
influenced by cognitive attributes (i.e., internal processes; Lupfer, Cohen, Bernard & 
Brown, 1986). In turn, the decision-making task encountered by jurors is believed to be 
influenced by reasonably stable cognitive attributes in relation to the situation-specific 
demands of the courtroom environment (Lupfer et al., 1986).
A growing body of research has documented a range of persuasion variables and 
processes that appear to influence jurors’ decision-making. These variables include 
variations in individual traits (e.g., Lupfer, Cohen, Bernard, & Brown, 1986; Kassin, 
Reddy, & Tulloch, 1990), jury instructions (e.g.. Hart, 1995; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; 
Schuller, Smith, & Olson, 1994; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979), order of presentations 
(e.g.. Stone, 1969; Walker, Thibaut, & Andreoli, 1972) and quality of arguments and/or 
testimonies (e.g., Kovera, Borgida, Gresham, Gray, & Regan, 1997; Cooper, Bennett & 
Sukel, 1996). The pair of studies presented in this thesis will primarily build upon the 
variations of the order of presentation of the arguments in order to examine the influences 
on jurors’ decision-making using a mock jury trial. Specifically, while using the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) as a basis for our theorizing, we 
will examine the role of need for cognition in an attempt to identify primacy and/or 
recency effects.
Primacy Effects or Recency Effects 
According to the existing literature, a primacy ejfect is obtained when information 
presented first has the most influence on an individual’s opinion. In contrast, if  the
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influence of the last message predominates, a recency effect is achieved. These effects of 
order of presentation have been investigated in a variety of persuasion settings. However, 
these possible biasing effects have been a concern within the context of a courtroom 
setting since at least 1925 when the Law o f Primacy in Persuasion was formulated by 
Lund:
“While the lawyer of the plaintiff is reviewing his case and 
making his appeal, the belief of the jurors is already in the 
process of formulation, and they are not to be dissuaded 
from their position by an equal amount of evidence or 
persuasive appeal on the part of the defendant’s lawyer, 
according to the law of primacy” (p.l91).
Therefore, Lund (1925) believed that the side of an issue presented first will have a
greater effect on jurors than the side presented subsequently.
In an attempt to test the primacy theory produced by Lund, Cromwell (1950) 
performed a study in which speeches were either opposed to or in support of socialized 
medicine and labour arbitration. Subjects’ opinions were measured before and after the 
talks. Results showed that subjects favoured the side presenting last, suggesting a recency 
effect. Hovland and Mandell (1957) obtained more conflicting results after conducting an 
entire series of studies in the primacy-recency paradigm on attitude change. According to 
one of their studies, which used written communication, only one of the three groups 
tested showed a primacy effect whereas the other two showed slight recency effects. 
Hovland and Mandell (1957) concluded that their results, in general, produced neither a 
primacy effect nor a recency effect and that future research efforts would benefit from 
determining the specific factors influencing either effect.
Rather than search for a general law of primacy or recency, Lana (1961) 
conducted a series of studies to explore Hovland and Mandell’s (1957) ideas. Lana’s first
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study (1961) tested whether familiarity of an issue influenced a primacy or recency 
effect. Surprisingly, results indicated primacy effects occurred under conditions of high 
familiarity whereas recency effects occurred under conditions of low familiarity with an 
issue. Lana’s (1963a) second study provided evidence for a moderating effect of interest 
level such that subjects who reported high interest in a topic demonstrated a significant 
primacy effect, whereas subjects who reported having low interest demonstrated a 
significant recency effect. Lana’s (1963b) final study explored issues of controversy, 
where results showed a significant primacy effect for a high controversy issue such as 
nuclear weapons, but not for a low-controversy issue such as Picasso. In conclusion, 
Lana’s results revealed that primacy and recency effects are dependent upon the issue at 
hand and the interest of the individual.
Subsequently, Rosnow and Robinson (1967) argued that simple order effects are 
not always the most important factors operating in any communication situation. After 
careful analysis and review of a number of experiments in persuasion, they concluded 
that controversial topics, interesting subject matter, materials that are very familiar to the 
reeeiver and issues that are seen as less important to the receiver are likely to elicit a 
primacy effect. In contrast, non-controversial topics, uninteresting subject matter, issues 
unfamiliar to the receiver, and issues that are seen as important are more likely to produce 
a recency effect.
Despite the series o f primacy-recency studies, instead of a general law of primacy 
or recency, there exists today an assortment of perspectives. Among the variety of 
perspectives are two hypotheses stemming from cognitive theories proposed to explain 
the common occurrence of either effect. First, the attention decrement hypothesis
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suggests that individuals will generally pay attention to early information rather than later 
stimuli, resulting in a primacy effect (Steiner & Rain, 1989). If, however, individuals are 
given a motive to continue to attend to information, a recency effect occurs. As an 
alternate viewpoint, the consistency hypothesis states that people try to maintain 
consistent impressions when confronted with relevant information (Gergen & Gergen, 
1981). That is, individuals form a first impression from early information; if later 
information presented is contradictory to the first they change their perceptions (of the 
later information) to conform to earlier perceptions. This makes the first information 
encountered more important and produces a primacy effect. However if  individuals can 
be open to new and contradictory information a recency effect results.
The latter hypothesis provides an explanation rooted in attitude strength. Attitude 
strength has recently provided a plausible account of how primacy and recency effects 
influence decision-making.
Cognitive Attributes in Persuasion
Attitude Strength
Contemporary work on attitude strength has examined the consequences of 
possessing strong versus weak attitudes. There are primarily two forms of consequences 
of attitude strength in the literature on persuasion; persistence and resistance. For 
instance, research has demonstrated that strong attitudes compared to weak ones are more 
persistent over time and are more likely to guide behaviour (e.g.. Petty & Krosnick,
1995). Therefore, persistence refers to a positively formed attitude that withstands time in 
the absence of any attack. On the other hand, resistance refers to any conduct that serves 
to maintain an attitude in the face of pressure to alter that attitude (i.e., high resistance
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refers to little or no change in the face of an attack, whereas low resistance refers to much 
change in the face of an attack; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). When considering attitude 
strength one must also consider the way attitudes are formed or changed. The Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) is a dual process 
model that deals with the formation and change of attitudes.
Elaboration Likelihood Model
The ELM explores individuals’ motivation and ability to process issue-relevant 
information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM characterizes persuasion through the 
operation of two routes: a central route or a peripheral route. Central processing is 
characterized by high motivation and high ability to elaborate cognitively issue-relevant 
information in forming or changing judgments. Conversely, peripheral processing is 
characterized by low motivation and low ability to engage in effortful processes. In these 
conditions, individuals will rely on cues (e.g., source expertise) to create or change 
attitudes.
Factors that enhance processing motivation include the need for cognition, 
personal relevance, and personal responsibility for evaluating the message (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Likewise, factors that enhance processing ability include message 
comprehensibility, message repetition, and low levels of external distraction (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). A key assumption of the ELM is that attitude changes that result 
mostly from central processing of issue-relevant arguments will show a greater resistance 
to counter-persuasion, greater temporal persistence, and greater prediction of behavior 
than attitude changes that result mostly from peripheral cues (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
In terms of motivation, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) reasoned that situational
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factors such as distraction and personal relevance, which increase the probability that 
individuals will think about and elaborate on externally provided messages, would affect 
persuasion. They also believed dispositional factors would direct message processing and 
thus also affect persuasion. One of the most interesting dispositional factors reviewed in 
the literature is the Need for Cognition.
Need fo r  Cognition
Need for cognition can be defined as an individual’s inclination to invest effort in 
and to participate in cognitive endeavors (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The Need for 
Cognition Scale, developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982), contains questions designed to 
assess a person’s reaction to requirements for effortful thinking in a variety of situations. 
In a review of the Need for Cognition Scale, Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein and Jarvis (1996) 
presented numerous studies which lent support to both the convergent and predictive 
validity of the measure. Specifically, they indicated that need for cognition is related 
(although relatively weak) to general intelligence and education; such that the need for 
cognition is related to high school grade point average (r = 26, p  < .01), college grade 
point average (meta-analysis r  = .17,/? < .01), verbal intelligence (meta-analysis r = .24,
/? < .01), and American College Testing Program Exam (ACT) scores (meta-analysis r = 
.26, p  < .01). In addition, they reported Cronbach reliability to equal .89.
From the time of its introduction into the psychological literature, need for 
cognition has been viewed as a variable reflecting cognitive motivation. Further research 
has supported the notion that need for cognition is a motivational variable by revealing 
that people who are high in need for cognition are more likely than people who are low in 
need for cognition to be curious (Osberg, 1987), to show a desire to maximize
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information gained from an experience (Sorrentino, Short, & Raynor, 1984), to show 
willingness to focus their attention on a task at hand (Osberg, 1987), to be intrinsically 
motivated (Olson, Camp, & Fuller, 1984), to perform better on recall and problem­
solving tasks (Domic, Ekehammar, & Laaksonen, 1991) and to engage in evaluative 
responding (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).
In addition, individuals high in need for cognition are more likely than those low 
in need for cognition to seek out and elaborate on relevant information when performing 
a task (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992). More specifically, the need for cognition is 
considered to be a personality variable that operationalizes the motivation to elaborate 
components of attitude change (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). Therefore, when subjected to 
message communications, individuals who are high in need for cognition are likely to 
engage in high elaboration and central processing, whereas those low in need for 
cognition are likely to engage in very little elaboration and process information 
peripherally (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992).
The Existing Literature 
Previous research has shown how the effect of a persuasive message can be 
influenced by individual differences and the extent to which individuals can extract and 
elaborate on the information presented to them. One of the earliest research studies in this 
area was conducted by Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe (1955). Subjects were randomly 
assigned to read and rate either a well-organized or an ambiguous story about an 
interview between a student and a potential employer. Results indicated that overall, 
individuals high in need for cognition evaluated the ambiguous story more negatively 
than the structured story. Thus, indicating that individuals high in need for cognition
Primacy and Recency 10
scrutinize communications more and are more affected by the quality of the arguments 
than low in need for cognition individuals.
In order to provide further and empirical support for the hypothesis that argument 
quality is a strong influencing factor in creating or changing attitudes of high need for 
cognition individuals, Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris (1983) conducted a two-study 
experiment in which subjects read either a strong or a weak argument in support of the 
recommendation that high-school seniors be required to pass a comprehensive exam in 
order to graduate (Experiment 1) or support a raise in student tuition (Experiment 2).
Prior to the experiment, the researchers ensured that subjects matched on their initial 
attitude toward the issue at hand. In both studies, manipulation of argument quality had a 
larger impact on individuals high in need for cognition than those low in need for 
cognition. Specifically, after exposure to the strong message, individuals high in need for 
cognition perceived the communicator to be more expert and trustworthy. In addition, 
they reported more effort thinking about the messages and recalled substantially more of 
the strong and weak arguments than individuals low in need for cognition. Also, 
individuals high in need for cognition exhibited a larger difference between attitudinal 
responses to the strong and weak message, and a stronger association between message 
evaluations and attitudes. Cacioppo et al. (1983) concluded that an examination of the 
fundamental sequence of message evaluation and attitudes supported the notion that post­
communication attitudes were influenced by the elaboration and evaluation of the 
arguments.
The goal of persuasive arguments is not only to influence a person’s attitudes but 
also to ensure that the change is durable. Research in the area of attitude strength has
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examined individual differences and the important implications it can have for the 
persistence and resistance of newly formed or changed attitudes (Haugtvedt & Petty, 
1992). One of the more pertinent studies conducted in this area analyzed differences in 
delayed responses of people who differ in the need for cognition (Haugtvedt & Petty, 
1992). This was a two-study experiment in which the first study specifically examined 
the persistence over time of both high and low need for cognition individuals. Subjects 
formed initial attitudes toward unknown brands of products after viewing persuasive 
messages (the use of an unknown brand ensured that the participants would not be 
exposed to additional information about the brand during the delay period outside the 
experimental setting). A couple of days later, attitudes toward the brands were assessed 
again. Results indicated that although high and low need for cognition subjects formed 
similarly favorable initial attitudes about the product, the attitudes of high in need for 
cognition individuals persisted over time to a greater degree than the attitudes of low in 
need for cognition individuals.
The second study carried out by Haugtvedt and Petty (1992) tested the resistance 
of judgments of high and low need for cognition individuals. Subjects were exposed to a 
message that strongly questioned the safety of a popular food additive (it is important to 
note that prior to the experiment, beliefs regarding the additive were positive, and were 
equivalent for both high and low need for cognition individuals). Minutes later, the 
message was followed by a counter-argument in support of the additive. After the initial 
message, there were no differences between the issue-relevant attitudes of high and low 
need for cognition individuals. However, following the counter-argument, subjects high 
in need for cognition, believed to have engaged in active counter argumentation, were
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uninfluenced by the attacking message. In contrast, subjects low in need for cognition 
agreed with the direction of the second message and moved back toward their pre- 
experimental beliefs that the food additive was safe. The study also showed that 
confidence in the initial attitudes of high in need for cognition individuals were based on 
the number of meaningful message arguments they could recall, whereas low in need for 
cognition individuals based their confidence of the initial message on the perceived 
source expertise and the amount of information contained in the message. Haugtvedt and 
Petty (1992) concluded that the results of the two studies show that a persuasive message 
should encourage thoughtfully mediated attitude change if  the resulting attitude is to be 
persistent over time and resistant to counterarguments.
While examining the influence of attitude strength on primacy and recency 
effects, Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) conceptualized primacy effects as involving high 
levels of attitude strength (and thus a resistance to change) for newly formed or changed 
attitudes during the initial message. They also conceptualized recency effects as 
involving low levels of attitude strength (and thus low levels of resistance). Thus primacy 
effects are more likely to occur when motivation and ability to elaborate on the initial 
message are high, therefore making it more likely to defend the strong attitude developed 
by the first message when facing an attack (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). Conversely, 
recency effects should most likely occur when motivation and ability to elaborate the first 
message are low (i.e., a weak attitude is developed for the initial message); therefore, 
allowing the second message (the most recently presented information) to have an impact 
when an attitudinal inquiry is made.
In order to test their hypotheses, Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) conducted a two-
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study experiment in which a random message order (i.e., pro/con, con/pro) was utilized. 
Subjects read arguments in favour of and against the institution of a senior 
comprehensive exam as a graduation requirement (Experiment 1) or in favour of and 
against the establishment of nuclear power plants (Experiment 2). In order to manipulate 
the likelihood of elaboration Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) created high and low 
relevance of the issues; thus for Experiment 1 subjects were told that either the exams 
were being considered for implementation at their university next year (high personal 
relevance) or being considered at a distant university for some time in the future (low 
personal relevance). For Experiment 2 subjects were told that Federal Energy Program 
documents proposed that nuclear power plants be built in distant states (low personal 
relevance) or in their own or nearby states (high personal relevance). Results indicated 
that messages in high levels of elaboration led to a greater influence of the first message 
on final judgments, therefore creating a primacy effect. On the other hand, when the issue 
at hand fostered low levels of message relevant elaboration it led to a greater influence of 
the second message on final judgments therefore creating a recency effect. Haugtvedt and 
Wegener (1994) concluded that in both experiments subjects who read the material under 
high personal relevance tended to counter-argue the second message more than subjects 
who read the low relevance material, therefore suggesting that counter arguments were 
elicited in defense of relatively strong attitudes.
The previous research strongly suggests that the attitudes of individuals high in 
need for cognition can be persistent over time, resistant to change, and are more 
influenced by a strong argument quality. In addition, the attitudes of high in need for 
cognition individuals are more likely to change as a result of effortful thinking about the
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merits presented in issue-relevant arguments. In contrast, the attitudes of individuals low 
in need for cognition are not likely to be as persistent over time, less resistant to change 
and are not likely to be influenced by high quality arguments. Instead, their attitudes are 
more likely to change as a result of positive images or values in a persuasive message.
Within the Context of the Courtroom 
Models o f Juror Decision-Making
Many models have attempted to explain the framework of how jurors reach a 
particular verdict. One theoretical orientation that has been influential in much research 
concerning juror decision-making is the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The 
Story Model of Juror Decision Making maintains that jurors arrive at a verdict as a result 
of a three-stage process (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The first stage is a story 
construction in which individuals organize and attempt to interpret trial evidence. This is 
done through the construction of a story with causal links between episodes in the story.
It is possible for individuals to construct more than one story; in that case, stories are 
judged on the basis of their acceptability. According to the Story Model, acceptability is a 
function of coherence, completeness, and uniqueness (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The 
second is verdict representation in which jurors construct a representation of a possible 
verdict. In most criminal cases, decisions consist of more than a “guilty” or “not guilty” 
verdict. For example, in the murder case used in Pennington and Hastie (1986) the juror 
has four options: first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, and not 
guilty. The third stage is the story classification in which the story constructed in stage 1 
is matched to the verdict representation of stage 2. The central element here is the best fit 
between the story and the various verdicts. Essentially, the verdict with the best fit to the
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story is hypothesized to be the one chosen by the juror (Pennington & Hastie, 1992).
Although the Story Model has provided a valuable theoretical approach to 
assessing juror decision-making, it offers a different account of the role of individual 
differences (Honess & Charman, 1992). The Story Model postulates that any differences 
in individuals’ story construction must arise from differences in beliefs and experiences 
about the social world (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). In contrast, dual processing models, 
such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model, hypothesize relatively stable individual 
differences (i.e., the need for cognition) that differentiate the processing style of 
individuals. This model will be the focus of this research.
Cognitive Individual Differences
As described above, in terms of consequences, courtroom arguments are one of 
the more persuasive forms of communication. Within the legal context, researchers, 
scholars, and legal professionals have focused most of their attention on attempting to 
identify the role of individual differences in juror decision-making. The conclusion from 
most of the research is that individual differences among jurors do make a difference. 
However, most research prior to the 1960s focused on adopting a global hypothesis that 
determined which people were “hardliners” (i.e., these individuals would be conviction 
prone to virtually any case; Hastie, 1993) and which were the “bleeding hearts” (i.e., 
these individuals would be acquittal prone for most cases; Hastie, 1993). Recent research 
now focuses on identifying simple individual differences.
For example, Kassin, Reddy and Tulloch (1990) examined the influence of order 
of presentation, need for cognition, and ambiguous evidence on juror decision-making. 
Subjects watched a 45 minute video of an interrogation in which the suspect emphatically
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denied the charges and asserted her innocence while telling an imperfect story. Before 
viewing the interrogation video, subjects were asked to read a summary of the case and 
were randomly assigned to receive either the prosecution’s or the defense’s argument 
concerning the suspect’s performance during interrogation. After viewing the 
interrogation video, subjects read counter-arguments ft"om the opposing side. Results 
indicated that subjects high in need for cognition were influenced primarily by arguments 
that preceded the interrogation video, whereas low in need for cognition subjects were 
influenced by arguments that followed the video. Specifically, subjects high in need for 
cognition were more likely to indicate a verdict in favour of the side that presented their 
argument before the interrogation video was viewed, whereas subjects low in need for 
cognition were more likely to indicate a verdict in favour of the side that presented after 
the interrogation video.
Research suggests that individual differences are influential in the process by 
which a juror makes a decision (Hastie, 1993). However, most studies have focused on 
identifying temporal and situational factors more so than dispositional factors. That is, 
little research has identified or expanded on enduring personality characteristics that 
make some jurors more susceptible to schematic biases than others. One construct that 
seems particularly relevant is the Need for Cognition. Individuals high in need for 
cognition tend to think carefully about persuasive messages and as such are more likely 
to be influenced by the strength and quality of the arguments. Moreover, when taking into 
consideration primacy and recency effects, individuals high in need for cognition are 
likely to be resistant to change and persistent over time, thus indicating that a primacy 
effect should prevail for them.
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Overview of the Research
Review of the previous literature has indicated that need for cognition and 
presentation order does influence juror decision-making. However, little research has 
examined the influence of argument strength within the context of the courtroom.^ From 
the reviewed literature on persuasion, it was shown that argument strength does interact 
with individuals’ need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1983).
No current research exists to suggest whether need for cognition, order of 
presentation and argument strength of the prosecution’s and defense’s closing arguments 
affect juror decision-making. Therefore, while using the ELM as a basis for our 
theorizing, two experiments were conducted to determine the influence of these factors. 
The focus of Experiment 1 was to examine the motivation of individuals through the 
application of the need for cognition scale. Subjects were asked to indicate a verdict 
following the presentation of conflicting arguments from the prosecution and defense in a 
court case which could arise in either a civil or criminal context. The focus of Experiment 
2 was to assess the motivation and ability of individuals through the application of the 
need for cognition scale and the manipulated complexity of expert witness testimonies. 
Subjects were asked to indicate a verdict following the presentation of conflicting 
arguments from the prosecution and defense, and the presentation of expert testimony for 
both sides on a criminal case.
Experiment 1
Support for my theoretical perspective comes from the previously reviewed
 ̂Argument strength has been operationally defined as statements which clearly provide sufficient or 
insufficient support for the prosecution or defense (Silzer & Clark, 1977). In the present study we observed 
that a “strong” message provided sufficient arguments and did not require fiirther evidence in order for 
mock jurors to make a decision. A “weak” argument provided insufficient arguments and required more 
evidence for mock jurors to make a decision.
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literature. That is, primacy effects are more likely to occur with individuals high in need 
for cognition and in contrast, recency effects are more likely to occur with individuals 
low in need for cognition. The cuirent study used a mock jury trial by which the strength 
of the arguments (i.e., strong vs. weak) presented by the prosecution and defense were 
varied in order to test these differences. The following hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis la: A primacy effect will occur with individuals high in need for cognition 
under conditions fostering strong arguments or weak arguments for both the prosecution 
and defense. This will result in finding the defendant “guilty” if the prosecution presents 
first followed by the defense or “not guilty” if the defense presents first followed by the 
prosecution.
Hypothesis lb: A recency effect will occur with individuals low in need for cognition 
under conditions fostering strong arguments or weak arguments for both the prosecution 
and defense. This would result in finding the defendant “not guilty” if  the prosecution 
presents first followed by the defense or “guilty” if the defense presents first followed by 
the prosecution.
Other predictions made were:
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals high in need for cognition under conditions fostering strong 
arguments followed by weak arguments, or weak arguments followed by strong 
arguments will render a verdict based on the strong arguments.
Hypothesis 2b: Individuals low in need for cognition under conditions fostering strong 
arguments followed by weak arguments, or weak arguments followed by strong 
arguments will determine a verdict based on the last presenter.
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Method
Participants
Two hundred and twenty-four undergraduate students participated from Saint 
Mary’s University. All participants received one bonus mark toward an introductory 
Psychology course for their participation.
Design
This study used a 2 (presentation order: prosecution first vs. defense first) X 2 
(prosecution’s argument strength: strong vs. weak) X 2 (defense’s argument strength: 
strong vs. weak) X 2 (need for cognition: high vs. low) between-subjects experimental 
design.
Materials
Case. The experiment used a hypothetical case which was used in previous 
literature on jury decision-making. The case could arise in either a civil or criminal court 
(Thibaut, Walker & Lind, 1972; Silzer & Clark, 1977). The case was explained by a brief 
summary which described a confrontation between two individuals, in which one 
individual stabbed the other with a piece of broken glass (see Appendix A).
Predictors Measures. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either the 
prosecution closing statement first followed by the defense closing statement, or the 
defense closing statement first followed by the prosecution closing statement. In addition, 
participants were also randomly assigned to receive one of the following four conditions 
of argument strength^: strong/strong, strong/weak, weak/strong or weak/weak (see
 ̂ A pilot study was conducted in order to verify the strength of the arguments presented. Ninety-two 
psychology students were given the case svunmary and randomly assigned to receive one of the four 
conditions: prosecution weak argument, prosecution strong argument, defense weak argument, or defense 
strong argument. Participants were then asked to rate the strength of the argument based a 7-point scale 
with 1 being “very weak” to 7 being “very strong”. T-tests were conducted and verified that there was a 
significant difference between the prosecution's strong and weak arguments, t  (22) = 4.74, p  <05  and the 
defense's strong and weak arguments, t (24) = -3.08,p <05. In addition, there was no significant difference 
between prosecution and defense's strong arguments, t (22) = .53, p  >.05 and the prosecution and defense's 
weak arguments, t  (25) = -.37, p  >.05.
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Appendix B). Participants were asked to complete the Need for Cognition Scale (see 
Appendix E). The score of the Need for Cognition Scale is based on the responses to 18 
items. Each item is based on a 4-point scale with 1 being “completely false” to 4 being 
“completely true”. Reliability coefficient for the scale in this study is equal to .81.
Dependent Measures. Participants were asked to indicate a verdict twice
following the presentation of all materials. First, participants were asked to state an 
official verdict of the defendant, finding the defendant either “guilty” or “not guilty” (see 
Appendix C). Second, participants were asked to rate the defendant on a culpability scale 
fi"om 1 = "not at all guilty" to 7 = "completely guilty" (see Appendix D).
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of up to 20. Each participant was given an 
informed consent form to read and sign. Participants were told that they would be acting 
as jury members in a court case, and they would have to find the defendant in the case 
either “guilty” or “not guilty.” Participants were then told that the defendant in the case 
was being accused of “assault with a weapon.” Participants were then given four 
envelopes in sequence containing the case, arguments, and questionnaires. Participants 
were instructed to read the material in the envelopes in the order to which they were 
assigned. Participants were also instructed to read the materials only once and not to refer 
back to any previously read material.
The first envelope contained an introductory statement telling participants that 
they were acting as a jury member in a court case where they would be reading a case 
summary, the closing arguments of the lawyers, and then determining a verdict, in 
addition to filling out a few questionnaires at the end. After reading the introductory 
statement, participants were asked to turn the page and read the case. The second and
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third envelopes contained the arguments for the prosecution and the defense to ensure 
that the participants would only read one argument at a time. The fourth envelope 
contained the dependent measures and the Need for Cognition Scale. After completing 
the task and returning all four envelopes to the experimenter, participants were given a 
feedback form and awarded one bonus point.
Results^
Verdict
Overall, 64% of individuals indicated a guilty verdict. A sequential logistic 
regression analysis was preformed to estimate the factors that influence juror decision­
making. The dependent variable was determined by either a guilty verdict equal to 1 or a 
not guilty verdict equal to 0. The model is presented in multiple steps with variables at 
each step simultaneously entered. The first step included all four independent variables 
(presentation order, need for cognition, prosecution’s strong/weak arguments and 
defense’s strong/weak arguments), the second step included the four independent 
variables and all two-way interaction variables, the third included the preceding variables 
and the three-way interaction variables, and the fourth step included all the preceding 
variables and the four-way interaction variable.
Step 1. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the overall significance 
of Step 1 (with the four predictors; presentation order, need for cognition, prosecution’s 
strong and weak arguments and defense’s strong and weak arguments) was statistically 
significant in predicting the verdict, %2 (4, #  = 224) = 18.00,/? < .01. When assessing
Individuals were categorized as high and low in need for cognition through a median split. A median split 
was used in order to be consistent with previous studies (e.g., Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). However in order 
to be thorough analyses were also mn using need for cognition as a continuous variable. The results were 
similar to that of a median split.
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goodness of fit, the model predicted 66% of the responses correctly. The only factor that 
influenced juror decision-making was the strength of the prosecution’s arguments (z = 
13.32,/? < .01; see Table 1). In order to determine the relationship between the verdict 
and the strength of the prosecution’s arguments a Pearson chi-square test was performed. 
The results showed a significant relationship between these two variables XL{\ ,N=  224) 
= 13.73,/? < .01. As shown fiom Figure 1, when the prosecution presented a strong 
argument a significant number of individuals decided a guilty verdict. In contrast, when 
the prosecution presented a weak argument there was little difference between the 
verdicts (i.e., guilty or not guilty).
Table 1
Step 1: Summary o f Binary Logistic Regression fo r  Main Effect Variables Predicting the 
Verdict
Variable B S.E. Wald P B
Order .41 .29 L95 = .16 1.51
Prosecution 1.1 .30 1332 <.01 2.94
Defense -.43 .29 2T3 = .15 .65
Need for 
Cognition .02 .02 .01 = .94 1.02
Note. The overall model was significant, x? (4, # = 2 2 4 ) = 18.00,/? < .01
Step 2. Step 2 included the four independent variables and the two-way 
interaction variables. According to the likelihood ratio test statistic there was a good 
model fit, %2 (10, 224) = 20.72,/? < .05. The model predicted 67% of the responses
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correctly. Wald statistics indicated no variables were significant.
Step 3. Step 3 included the four independent variables, the two-way interaction 
variables, and the three-way interaction variables. Overall the model was not significant 
in predicting the verdict, %2 (14, N =  224) = 22.32, p  = .07. When assessing goodness of 
fit, the model predicted 66% of the responses correctly. In addition, no variables were 
significant.
Figure 1. Juror’s responses to prosecution’s strength of arguments based on verdict.
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Step 4. Step 4 included the four independent variables, the two-way interaction 
variables, the three-way interaction variables and the four-way interaction variable. 
Although not quite significant the model had a strong trend towards predicting the 
verdict, %2 (15, N = 224) = 24.64, p = .06. The model predicted 67% of the responses 
correctly. No variables were statistically significant.
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Culpability Scale
Overall, individuals decided on a higher level of guilt (M = 4.48) on the 
culpability scale (1 = not at all guilty to 7 = completely guilty). In order to examine 
which factors influence juror decision-making an ANOVA was performed. The analysis 
of variance included the independent variables, two-way interaction variables, three-way 
interaction variables, and the four-way interaction variable. The ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect for the strength of the prosecution’s arguments, F  (1, 224) = 
17.36,/? < .01 (see Table 2). The mean responses indicated that individuals decided more 
towards a higher level of guilt (M= 4.85) when presented with a strong argument from 
the prosecution as opposed to a weak argument (M - 4.11).
TdWe2
Analysis o f Variance fo r  Culpability Scale
Source d f F p <
Order 1 3.70 .06
Prosecution 1 1736* .01
Defense 1 332 .07
Need for Cognition 1 131 .18
Note: The = . 171 indicating the model is not a good predictor of the response variable.
Overall, there was a significant interaction between order, strength of 
prosecution’s arguments, strength of defense’s arguments and need for cognition, F  (1, 
224) = 5.66, /? < .05. Individuals high in need for cognition decided on a higher degree of 
guilt when the prosecution presented a strong argument, regardless of the order of 
presentation. In contrast, individuals low in need for cognition decided on a degree of
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guilt in favour of the last presenter, except when the prosecution presented a strong 
argument. For example, when the defense presented last individuals low in need for 
cognition were more likely to indicate a lower degree of guilt. Table 3 and Figure 2 are 
presented to show the interactions of the predictor measures.
TdWe3
Mean Response Scores o f  the Culpability Scale with Order o f Presentation, Strength o f  
Prosecution’s Arguments, Strength o f Defense's Arguments and Need fo r  Cognition(NC)
Prosecution First
LowNC
Weak Pros Strong Pros
HighNC





Strong Def 3.23a 4.67b Strong Def 4.00a 5.06b
LowNC 
Weak Pros Strong Pros
Defense First
HighNC 





Strong Def 4.44a 4.35a Strong Def 4.00a 4.75b
Note. Z-scores were conducted in order to find mean differences. Means in the same group that do not 
share subscripts differ at the p  < .05, two-tailed.
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Figure 2. Juror Mean Response Scores of the Culpability Scale with Order of 
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Discussion: Experiment 1 
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that the strength of the prosecution’s 
arguments had a significant influence on juror decision-making when deciding a verdict on 
the dichotomous variable and the culpability scale. These results are supported by an earlier 
study conducted by Silzer and Clark (1977) in which participants were asked to judge a 
case where both the number of arguments and strength of arguments of the prosecution and 
defense were manipulated. Overall, the results revealed that it took significantly more 
arguments and stronger arguments for the prosecution to move subjects closer to a response 
of guilty. Silzer and Clark (1977) explained these outcomes by the instructions given to 
jurors upon entering a courtroom. That is, jurors are asked to keep open minds and to 
always hold an assumption of innocence until proven guilty, therefore indicating that the 
burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Thus, as expected, it should take stronger 
prosecution arguments to move juror’s closer to a response of guilt than it would take 
arguments from the defense to move decisions closer to innocence. The results of the 
present study revealed just that. That is, when the prosecution presented strong arguments 
individuals were more likely to decide a guilty verdict.
Results of the ANOVA demonstrated that a significant interaction occurred 
between the four independent variables. When assessing the mean responses, individuals 
high in need for cognition indicated a verdict in favour of the prosecution’s strong 
argument. Specifically, when presented with strong arguments from the prosecution, 
regardless of the strength of the defense’s argument and the order of presentation, 
individuals high in need for cognition decided on a higher level of guilt. This result is in 
contrast with Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) in which they concluded primacy effects are
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likely to occur with individuals high in need for cognition, therefore making it more likely 
to defend the strong attitude developed by the first message when facing an attack. In this 
case, we can assume that individuals high in need for cognition attended carefiilly to all the 
arguments presented and made a decision based on the strength of arguments rather than 
the order of presentation. This result supports previously mentioned views on need for 
cognition and persuasion which indicate that individuals high in need for cognition 
scrutinize information presented to them and are more affected by the quality of the 
arguments.
When assessing individuals low in need for cognition, our hypotheses was partly 
supported. That is, individuals low in need for cognition favoured the side that presented 
last, except when the prosecution presented strong arguments. These results indicate that a 
recency effect took place and are consistent with the previously mentioned studies which 
indicate that individuals low in need for cognition may be relatively unmotivated to 
carefully attend to all the evidence, therefore falling prey to information which they heard 
last. In addition, when presented with a weak argument followed by a strong counter­
argument, individuals low in need for cognition were more prone to a recency effect. 
However, when presented with a strong argument followed by a weak counter-argument 
the results were mixed. This suggests that individuals low in need for cognition were more 
prone to an order effect.
Although the results of Experiment 1 do not support our hypotheses fully, it does 
provide some evidence in support of past research on presentation order effects, argument 
strength, and indications of individual differences. In order to examine further the 
influenee of these variables on juror decision-making a second experiment was
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conducted. Participants were asked to determine a verdict following the presentation of 
conflicting arguments from the prosecution and defense in a criminal case. In addition, 
the influence of expert testimony and the complexity of their arguments were also 
examined in order to examine comprehensibility. Expert testimony is believed to be 
valuable in the context of a courtroom and the ability of jury members to comprehend the 
testimony can have important implications on the decisions they render.
Experiment 2
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, individuals presented with a 
persuasive message can take two routes to arrive at an attitude (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Whether an individual will follow the central route or the peripheral route to persuasion is 
determined by the likelihood of elaboration, which in turn, is influenced by the 
individual’s motivation and ability to process the information presented. In Experiment 1 
we attempted to assess an individuals’ motivation through the application of the Need for 
Cognition scale. Drawing further on the ELM, Experiment 2 was designed to specifically 
assess the ability of individuals through the application of complex and simplified expert 
testimonies presented by the prosecution and defense. Message comprehensibility has 
been identified as a factor that evaluates processing ability (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
The introduction of expert witness testimony in both criminal and civil trials has 
proliferated in the past thirty years (Cooper, Bennett, & Sukel, 1996). The purpose of 
expert testimony is to bridge the gap between common knowledge and specialized 
knowledge therefore allowing juries to understand and evaluate the facts so that they may 
form their own opinions and decide on a verdict (Pipkin, 1989).
The impact of expert testimony in a trial can be profound. In a 1993 poll of civil
Primacy and Recency 30
and criminal trials conducted by the National Law Journal, eighty-nine percent of jurors 
that heard an expert’s testimony in court thought the expert was not only believable but 
credible as well. This same poll established that jurors also found expert testimony to 
often influence the outcome of the trial. Specifically, it was reported that seventy-one 
percent of the jurors polled said experts made a difference in the verdict (Cheever & 
Naiman, 1993). These observations demonstrate the necessity of conducting research on 
the impact of experts’ testimony and the influence it may have on jurors’ decision­
making. However, before we reference some existing literature regarding the influence of 
expert testimonies on individual differences, it is important to note the many 
controversies that lie within the legal system regarding the admission and precision of 
expert testimony.
Expert witnesses are usually granted special licenses which allow them to offer 
their opinions and knowledge of the issue at hand. However, research has indicated there 
are some inherent dangers in these opinions (Gold, 2002). That is, sometimes opinions 
offered as expertise have little or no probable value to the issue at hand and may be 
referred to as “junk science” (Gold, 2002). A cure identified for false expert evidence is 
to follow the scientific method. The scientific method, which has been administered in 
both Canada and the United States, requires expert witnesses to convey evidence which 
constitutes scientific literature and not subjective opinions. Although the administration 
of the scientific method has substantially improved the legal system, there is an important 
drawback to be noted: the file drawer effect. Essentially the file drawer effect refers to 
“what is news gets published, what is not stays in the file drawer” (Gold, 2002, p. 14). In 
most circumstance studies declaring significant results are more likely to be published
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than studies with negative results. Thus, non significant results, even though possibly 
valuable, may not be provided as scientific literature, which in turn, may limit the 
evidence that expert witnesses can provide to the judges and jurors (see Rosenthal, 1979).
Contemporary research has uncovered a number of variables that appear to 
influence the impact of expert testimony on juror’s decision-making. For example, 
Schuller and Cripps (1998) conducted a study in which jurors were presented with expert 
testimony pertaining to battered women’s syndrome. The trial was presented as a 
homicide which involved a battered woman who had killed her abuser. Results showed 
that mock jurors were more lenient in their verdicts and more likely to believe the 
battered woman’s claim of self-defense when the expert was a female as opposed to 
male. Another variable assessed in this study involved the timing of the presentation of 
the testimony. The study found support for the beneficial impact of an early presentation 
of expert testimony as opposed to a later presentation of the testimony.
Other research in this area has also shown that complexity of expert testimony can 
influence jurors’ decision-making. For instance, Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel (1996) 
conducted a juror simulation study involving a civil case where they varied the 
information that jurors received on the credentials of the expert (i.e., qualifications, 
current academic position, number of publications, and number of prestigious scientific 
positions). They hypothesized that juror’s receptivity to complex expert testimony would 
be influenced by peripheral cues relating to source expertise and credibility. The results 
verified their hypothesis and revealed mock jurors who heard complex testimony were 
more persuaded by a highly credentialed expert witness than by an expert witness with 
fewer credentials; this was not evident when subjects were exposed to a simplified form
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of the testimony. In general, Cooper et al. concluded that individuals who may not have 
the background to process complex messages will probably not engage in the careful 
scrutiny of the message; instead they will rely on peripheral cues and engage in heuristic 
processing.
Although research has uncovered a range of variables that appear to influence the 
impact of expert testimony on jurors’ decision process, no research has attempted to 
explore individual differences of jury members and the implications it can have when 
comprehending expert testimony. Research on persuasion shows that individuals do not 
always carefully scrutinize the quality of a message, especially if the motivation and 
ability to attend to the message is lacking or, in the case of complex messages, impaired. 
Within the context of a courtroom we assume that jurors have the motivation to serve 
justice, which would include trying to assess the content of the messages, however, they 
may lack in the ability to process the information presented (Cooper et al., 1996). 
Therefore, instead of attending to the quality and validity of the arguments, jurors may 
rely on a variety of factors associated with the message or the messenger (e.g., order of 
the arguments and source expertise)
As previously noted the ELM examines motivation and ability. In Experiment 1 
we used the Need for Cognition scale to assess the motivation of individuals to attend to 
the arguments provided by the prosecution and defense. In Experiment 2 we used 
complex and simplified expert testimonies in order to examine the ability factor portrayed 
in the ELM. Specifically, this study will build upon the variables assessed in Experiment 
1 (order of presentation, strength of arguments and need for cognition) and will take it 
one step fiirther by examining the ability of individuals when presented with expert
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testimony (introduced by both the prosecution and defense from expertise with the same 
credentials) to determine the influence it may have on the decision maker during the 
process that occurs in forming attitudes or opinions.
The present research was designed to evaluate how the comprehension of 
complex and simplified expert testimonies affects individuals high and low in need for 
cognition during the decision-making process. The study used a mock jury trial to test 
these differences. Based on the previous literature, the following hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 1 : Individuals high in need for cognition should put more effort into 
processing the arguments and testimonies presented to them and therefore are less 
affected by the complexity of expert testimonies.




Two hundred and eighty-eight undergraduate students participated from Saint 
Mary’s University. All participants received one bonus mark toward an introductory 
psychology course for their participation.
Design
This study used a 2 (presentation order: prosecution first vs. defense first) X 2 
(argument strength: strong vs. weak) X 2 (prosecution expert testimony: simple vs. 
complex) X 2 (defense expert testimony: simple vs. complex) X 2 (need for cognition: 
high vs. low) between-subjects experimental design.
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Materials
Case. The experiment used a hypothetical criminal case. The case was explained 
by a brief summary in which a married man is charged with the murder of his wife and 
her companion (see Appendix F). Arguments and testimonies for this case were derived 
from a similar case used in previous research on jury decision-making (Hastie, 1993).
Predictors. Consistent with Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to 
receive either the prosecution’s closing argument followed by the defense’s closing 
argument or the defense’s closing argument followed by the prosecution’s closing 
argument. Participants were also randomly assigned to receive either weak or strong 
arguments throughout the case (i.e., the case would mutually contain either weak/weak or 
strong/strong arguments [see Appendix I for case arguments]).^ In addition, participants 
were also randomly assigned to receive one of the four conditions of expert witness 
testimonies (see Appendix J). It is important to note that the credential of each expert 
witness was equal for both sides. All participants were asked to complete the 18-item 
Need for Cognition Scale (see Appendix E). Reliability coefficient for the Need for 
Cognition Scale in this study is equal to .87.
Dependent Measures. Participants were asked to indicate a verdict following the
 ̂Pilot studies were conducted to verify the strength of the arguments and complexity of expert’s 
testimonies of the criminal case. Fifty-two psychology students were given the case summary of the 
criminal case and randomly assigned to receive one argument from the prosecution or defense and one 
expert testimony from the prosecution or defense. Participants were then asked to rate the strength and 
complexity of the arguments based a 7-point scale with 1 “very weak” to 7 “very strong” and 1 “very 
simple” to 7 “very complex”. T-tests were conducted and verified that there was a significant difference 
between the prosecution's strong and weak arguments, t (10) = 3.71, p  <.05, and the defense's strong and 
weak arguments, t  (13) = 4.27, p  <05, as well as experts simple and complex arguments for the prosecution 
/ (10) = -5.49,p <.05 and for the defense, t (13) = -5.21,p  <05. In addition, there was no significant 
difference between prosecution and defense's strong arguments, t (10) = 1.01, p  >.05, and the prosecution 
and defense's weak arguments, t (11) = -2.35, p  >05, as well as the expert’s simple arguments for the 
prosecution and defense, f (11) = .33, p  >.05, and the expert’s complex arguments for the prosecution and 
defense, t (10) = .77,p>.05.
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presentation of all materials. Specifically, all participants were asked to state an official 
verdict of the defendant, finding him/her either “guilty” or “not guilty”.®
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of up to 20. Each participant was given an 
informed consent form to read and sign. Participants were told that they would be acting 
as a jury member in a court case, and they would have to find the defendant either 
“guilty” or “not guilty.” All experimental materials including instructions, the case, the 
arguments and questionnaires to assess verdicts were contained in single mimeographed 
booklet. Participants were instructed to read the booklet in sequence, concentrating on 
one page at a time and not to look ahead or back at other pages. The booklets were 
arranged in random order representing the experimental conditions and were distributed 
to subjects by random assignment. After completing the task and returning the completed 
booklet to the experimenter, each participant was given a feedback form and awarded one 
bonus point.
Results
Overall, 43% of individuals indicated a guilty verdict. A sequential logistic 
regression analysis was performed to estimate the factors that influence mock juror 
decision-making. The dependent variable was determined by either a guilty verdict equal 
to 1 or a not guilty verdict equal to 0. The model is presented in multiple steps with 
variables at each step simultaneously entered. The first step included the five independent
® It is important to note the difference between the dependent variables from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 1 we used a case which could be tried in either a civil or criminal court, however. 
Experiment 2 consists of a specified criminal case. Previous research has noted that criminal cases do not 
generalize to civil cases (Raitz et al., 1990). In criminal cases, jurors usually only have to choose between a 
guilty and not guilty verdict. In civil cases, the jury can select a compromised award to the plaintiff and are 
not constricted to the damages that are claimed by the plantiff. Therefore, in order to follow the same 
procedures as in real court proceeding we have followed the standard practice and only allowed a specific 
verdict in Experiment 2.
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variables (presentation order, need for cognition, strength of arguments, prosecution’s 
expert testimony, and defense’s expert testimony), the second step included the five 
independent variables and two-way interaction variables, the third included the preceding 
variables and the three-way interaction variables, the fourth step included all the 
preceding variables and the four-way interaction variables and the fifth step included all 
preceding variables and the five-way interaction variable.
Step 1. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the overall significance 
of step 1 with the five predictors was statistically significant in predicting the verdict, %2 
(5, N = 288) = 26.26, p < .01. When assessing goodness of fit the model predicted 65% of 
the responses correctly. According to the Wald statistic the only statistically significant 
factor was strength of arguments, z = 23.21, p < .01 (see Appendix K). Mean responses 
indicated, when presented with strong arguments 58% of individuals decided on a verdict 
of guilty. However when presented with weak arguments only 38% of individuals 
decided a guilty verdict. In order to determine the relationship between the verdict and 
the strength of the arguments a Pearson chi-square test was performed. The results 
showed a significant effect %2 (1, N = 288) = 23.98, p < .01. As shown fi-om Figure 3, 
when presented with weak arguments significantly more individuals decided a not guilty 
verdict. In contrast when presented with strong arguments more individuals decided a 
guilty verdict.
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Figure 3. Jurors responses to strength of arguments based on verdict.
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Step 2. Step 2 included the independent variables and the two-way interaction 
variables. According to the likelihood ratio test statistic there was a good model fit, %2 
(15, N = 288) = 42.05, p < .01. The model predicted 66% of the responses correctly. 
Wald statistic showed the interaction of defense expert testimony with need for cognition 
was statistically significant (z = 7.26, p < .01). Mean responses are presented in Table 4 
below. When presented with simple expert testimony from the defense, 38% of 
individuals low in need for cognition decided in favour of a guilty verdict. However, 
when presented with complex expert testimony, 55% of individuals low in need for 
cognition decided in favour of a guilty verdict. A Pearson chi-square was performed to 
test the relationship between these variables. The results revealed a significant effect for 
individuals low in need for cognition %2 (1, N = 147) = 4.25, p < .05, but not for 
individuals high in need for cognition, %2 (1, N =  141) -  1.21, p = .27. As shown in
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Figure 4, when presented with simple defense expert testimony, individuals low in need 
for cognition were more likely to indicate a not guilty verdict in favour of the defense. In 
contrast when presented with complex defense expert testimony more individuals voted 
guilty in favour of the prosecution. Figure 4 also includes the results for individuals high 
in need for cognition for comparison.
Table 4
Percentages o f Mean Response fo r  a Guilty Verdict with Defense’s Expert Testimonies by 
Need for Cognition (NC)
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Figure 4. Jurors responses with defense expert testimonies by need for cognition.
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Step 3. Step 3 included the preceding variables and all three-way interaction 
variables. Overall the model was statistically significant in predicting the verdict, %2 (25, 
N= 288) = 60.32, p < .01. When assessing goodness of fit the model predicted 68% of the 
responses correctly. Wald statistic showed that strength of arguments by prosecution’s 
expert testimony by defense’s expert testimony was statistically significant (z = 7.80, p < 
.01). Percentages of mean responses are presented in Table 5. Overall, when presented 
with weak arguments significantly fewer individuals decided a guilty verdict, in contrast 
when presented with strong arguments a greater number of individuals decided a guilty 
verdict. Specifically, when assessing these results closer we can see that when presented 
with the same complexity of expert testimony from both sides, individuals based their 
decision on the strength of the arguments in favour of the prosecution (this result is 
similar to that of Experiment 1 in which we found strong prosecution arguments to have 
an affect). For example when presented with weak arguments by simple prosecution 
expert testimony by simple defense expert testimony only 17% decided in favour of a
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guilty verdict. In contrast, 64% of individuals decided a guilty verdict when presented 
with a strong argument by simple prosecution expert testimony by simple defense expert 
testimony. When presented with different complexities of expert testimonies the results 
are mixed.
TdWeS
Percentages ofMean Response for a Guilty Verdict with Strength o f Arguments, 
Prosecution’s Expert Testimonies and Defense’s Expert Testimonies
Weak Arguments Strong Arguments





Complex D 39% 19% Complex D 56% 67%
Pearson chi-square tests were performed to determine the relationship of these 
variables. When presented with weak arguments by simple defense expert testimony by 
prosecution expert testimony the result was significant, %2 (1, N = 72) = 4.25, p < .05. As 
shown in Figure 5 when presented with weak arguments by simple defense testimony by 
simple prosecution testimony, a significantly greater amount of individuals decided a not 
guilty verdict in favour of the defense. In addition, when presented with weak arguments 
by simple defense testimony by complex prosecution testimony more individuals decided 
a not guilty verdict in favour of the defense.
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Figure 5. Verdict response of jurors on the presentation of weak arguments by simple 
defense expert testimony by prosecution expert testimonies.
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The remaining variables were found to be not significant. That is, when presented 
with weak arguments by complex defense expert testimony by prosecution expert 
testimony the result was not significant, %2 (1, N = 72) = 3.29, p = .07, similarly when 
presented with strong arguments by simple defense expert testimony by prosecution 
expert testimony the result was not significant, %2 (1, N = 72) = 2.74, p = .09 and yet 
again when presented with strong arguments by complex defense expert testimony by 
prosecution expert testimony the result was not significant, %2 (1, N = 72) = .94, p = .33.
In addition, the Wald statistic also showed that strength of arguments by defense’s 
expert testimony by need for cognition was statistically significant (z = 4.57, p < .05). 
Mean responses are presented in Table 6 below. As shown fi'om the table, when
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presented with strong arguments, as opposed to weak arguments, regardless of the 
complexity of defense’s expert testimony, individuals high and low in need for cognition 
were more likely to decided in favour o f a guilty verdict. This result supports previously 
mentioned results, of Experiment 1, which indicate the strength of arguments to influence 
juror decision-making. The mean responses also show a significant difference in favour 
of a guilty decision in individuals high and low in need for cognition when presented 
with a weak argument and a complex expert testimony. That is, 48% of individuals low 
in need for cognition indicated a guilty verdict as opposed to only 13% of individual high 
in need for cognition.
TdWe6
Percentages o f Mean Response fo r  a Guilty Verdict with Strength ofArguments, 
Defense’s Expert Testimonies and Need fo r  Cognition (NC)
Low NC HighNC





Complex 48% 60% Complex 13% 63%
Pearson chi-square tests were performed to determine the relationship of these 
variables. When presented with weak arguments by defense expert testimonies by low in 
need for cognition individuals the result was significant, %Z(1,N = 63) = 5.62, p < .05. 
When presented with weak arguments by defense expert testimonies by high in need for 
cognition individuals the results was also significant, %2 (1, N = 81) = 4.74, p < .05.
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However, strong arguments by defense expert testimonies by low in need for cognition 
individuals was not significant, %2 (1, N = 84) = .85, p = .36, and strong arguments by 
defense expert testimonies by high in need for cognition individuals was also not 
significant, %2 (1, N = 60) = .02, p = .89. As shown in Figure 6 when presented with weak 
arguments and simple defense expert testimony a significantly greater number of 
individuals low in need for cognition decided a not guilty verdict. In contrast, when 
presented with weak arguments and complex defense expert testimony more individuals 
high in need for cognition decided a not guilty verdict.
Figure 6. Jurors response on the presentation of weak arguments by defense expert 
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Step 4. Step 4 included the preceding variables and four-way interaction variables. 
The model was statistically significant in predicting the verdict, %2 (30, N= 288) = 64.40, 
p < .01. The model predicted 68% of the responses correctly. No factors were statistically 
significant.
Step 5. Step 5 included all the preceding variables and the five-way interaction 
variable. The model was statistically significant in predicting the verdict, %2 (31, N =  288) 
= 65.05, p < .01. When assessing goodness of fit the model predicted 68% of the 
responses correctly. No factors were statistically significant
Discussion: Experiment 2
Overall, the results firom Experiment 2 revealed that the strength of the arguments 
had a significant influence on juror decision-making. Specifically, when presented with 
strong arguments individuals had a tendency to side with the prosecution and decide 
towards a guilty verdict. Conversely, when presented with weak arguments individuals
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had a tendency to side with the defense and decide on a not guilty verdict. These results 
are supported by previous literature which indicates that argument quality is a strong 
influencing factor in creating or changing attitudes. However, unlike Cacioppo et al. 
(1983) there was no difference between individuals high and low in need for cognition. A 
possible explanation for the lack of this result could be due to the environment that we 
have attempted to replicate. That is, within the context of a courtroom we assume that 
jurors have the motivation to serve justice, which would include trying to assess the 
content of the messages regardless of their individual differences. We suggest that this 
was the case and determine that strength of arguments, specifically strong prosecution 
arguments, are the primary determining factor in influencing juror’s decision-making.
With respect to assessing juror’s ability through the manipulation of complex and 
simplified expert testimonies, the results revealed that only the defense’s expert 
testimony had a significant influence on individuals high and low in need for cognition. 
This result may be supported by the regulations of the legal system. That is, it is up to the 
defense to cast doubt in the minds of the jurors that their defendant is innocent. Thus, 
jurors may weigh the defense’s expert testimonies more than that of the prosecution’s 
because they are looking for information which may cast doubt in their minds that the 
defendant is innocent. When assessing these results closer, a significantly greater number 
of individuals low in need for cognition had a tendency to decide in favour of a not guilty 
verdict when presented with simple defense expert testimony. When presented with 
complex defense expert testimony more individuals low in need for cognition decided in 
favour of a guilty verdict. A possible explanation for this effect may be that individuals 
low in need for cognition did not have the motivation and/or the ability to understand the
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complex testimony and hence decided that it was not valid therefore deciding a verdict 
against the defense. These results are in partial support of our hypothesis and suggest that 
individuals low in need for cognition were more affected by complex expert testimonies. 
In addition, these results are supported by the literature on persuasion which suggests that 
individuals low in need for cognition generally do not engage in the careful scrutiny of 
the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
In addition, the joint effect of defense expert testimony, need for cognition and 
strength of arguments was also found to be statistically significant. Overall, when 
presented with strong arguments, as opposed to weak arguments, regardless of the 
complexity of defense’s expert testimony, individuals high and low in need for cognition 
were more likely to decided a guilty verdict. This result further supports the notion that 
strength of arguments has a significant influence on juror decision-making. More 
specifically, we can determine that the strength of the prosecutions arguments was the 
primary determining factor since jurors voted in favour of the prosecution when 
presented with strong arguments.
In order to determine the relationship between these variables chi-square analysis 
were performed and found that when presented with weak arguments and simple defense 
expert testimony a significantly greater number of individuals low in need for cognition 
decided a not guilty verdict. In contrast, when presented with weak arguments and 
complex or simple defense expert testimony individuals high in need for cognition, 
overall, decided a not guilty verdict. These results may suggest that under conditions of 
weak arguments individuals low in need for cognition were more affected by the defense 
complex expert testimony, possibly indicating that these individuals may have decided
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that the testimony was not valid therefore deciding a verdict against the defense.
However, individuals high in need for cognition under conditions of weak arguments 
seemed to be generally unaffected by either the complex or simplified expert testimony. 
Instead, it appeared that individuals high in need for cognition based their decision on the 
strength of the arguments (i.e., because weak arguments were presented individuals high 
in need for cognition decided against the prosecution and determined not guilty in favour 
of the defense).
When assessing strength of arguments and expert testimonies, we found that there 
was a significant difference when deciding a verdict. Overall, when presented with weak 
arguments, prosecution expert testimonies, and defense expert testimonies, individuals 
had a tendency to favour a not guilty verdict in favour of the defense. However when 
presented with strong arguments, prosecution expert testimonies and defense expert 
testimonies individuals were more likely to decide towards a guilty verdict. This result 
may suggest that individuals overall based their decision on the strength of the arguments 
and more specifically in favour of strong prosecution arguments. This result is supported 
by the results of Experiment 1 where strong prosecution arguments had the most 
influence.
When assessing these results more closely, we found that only weak arguments 
and simple defense expert testimony by prosecution expert testimonies had a significant 
influence. Overall, these results may suggest that when presented with weak arguments 
and simple defense expert testimony individuals will generally decide in favour of the 
defense and indicate a not guilty verdict. Specifically, when presented with weak 
arguments by simple defense testimony by simple prosecution testimony, a significantly
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greater number of individuals decided a not guilty verdict in favour of the defense. This 
result may suggest that jurors will revert to the strength of the arguments when presented 
with equal complexity of expert testimony from the prosecution and defense; in effect 
ignoring the expert testimonies but determining their verdict based on the strength of the 
prosecution’s arguments. In addition, when presented with weak arguments by simple 
defense testimony by complex prosecution testimony, more individuals decided a not 
guilty verdict in favour of the defense. This result may suggest that individuals were 
affected by the complexity of the prosecution’s expert testimony and may have not 
believed in the argument therefore deciding against it and reverting to other factors (in 
this case the simplicity of the defense’s expert testimony) on which to base their decision.
General Discussion
In court litigations, jurors are often in a difficult predicament; they are usually 
bombarded with information and are expected to process all of it when deciding on a 
verdict. However, previous research has noted that some factors may be more influential 
than others. The present study has looked at various variables and indicated that strength 
of the arguments has the most influence on juror’s decision-making.
Experiment 1 showed that the strength of the prosecution’s arguments had the 
most influence. As Silzer and Clark (1977) have reported, results such as these are 
consistent with the underlying concept of the judicial system, where the burden of proof 
lies with the prosecution and not the defense. That is, it is up to the prosecution to present 
sufficient arguments which prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. 
The results of Experiment 2 helped to solidify the evidence that strength of the arguments 
do influence juror’s decision-making. Specifically, logistic regression models found
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strength of arguments to be significant as a main effect variable and as an interaction 
variable.
Overall, the mean responses for Experiment 1 on the culpability scale revealed 
that individuals high in need for cognition based tbeir decisions on the strength of the 
arguments, specifically the strength of the prosecution’s arguments. That is, when the 
prosecution presented a strong argument (regardless of the order of the presentation and 
regardless of the strength of the defense’s argument), individuals high in need for 
cognition had a tendency to decide guilty. These results are supportive of Petty and 
Caccioppo’s (1986) views of persuasion. That is, individuals high in need for cognition 
engage in central processing and therefore, carefully scrutinize information presented to 
them; in this case the strength of the prosecutions argument. In contrast to those 
individuals high in need for cognition, individuals low in need for cognition had a 
tendency to favour the order of presentation. Specifically, individuals low in need for 
cognition had a tendency to favour the last presenter, except when the prosecution 
presented a strong argument, therefore indicating a recency effect. These results are 
consistent with our hypothesis and previous research on need for cognition and 
presentation order, indicating that individuals low in need for cognition may be relatively 
unmotivated to process extensively the information presented to them, therefore basing 
their judgments on what they last heard.
Unlike Experiment 1 the overall results of Experiment 2 showed no significant 
interaction between the predictor variables. This result is possibly due to the restriction 
for a specific verdict in Experiment 2. That is, individuals were asked to give a verdict of 
“guilty” or “not guilty” and not asked to determine the degree of guilt as they were asked
Primacy and Recency 50
to do in Experiment 1. However, the results of Experiment 2 did reveal differences 
among individuals high and low in need for cognition and defense’s expert testimony. 
Specifically, individual low in need for cognition were affected by the complexity of the 
defense’s expert testimony. This result supports previously reported studies which 
indicate when individual’s ability to process information is impaired, they rely on a 
peripheral cue such as source expertise or, in this case, the simplicity of the testimony.
Why does the defense’s expert testimony influence individuals high and low in 
need for cognition and not the prosecution’s? One possible explanation is the standard 
principal of the legal system. That is, it is up to the defense to cast doubt on the 
prosecutions arguments that the defendant is innocent. Thus, indicating that jurors may 
weigh more heavily the defense’s expert testimony more so than that of the prosecution’s. 
It is important to note here that although the participants in this study were not instructed 
on the principles of the law, it has been suggested that this is a generally accepted 
principal.
Overall, our results present sufficient evidence to suggest strength of the 
arguments, specifically strong prosecution arguments, are the primary influencing factors 
for juror’s when deciding on a verdict.
Limitations o f the Study/Future Research
Several limitations concerning the generalizability of these findings are in order. 
First and foremost, participants of this study knew that their decisions carried no real 
consequences and therefore may have put less effort into the task than a real court 
proceeding. Secondly, the study was limited to university students and may have been 
characterized by less heterogeneity in terms of age and educational level than jurors in an
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actual trial (e.g., Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). For example, because this study only 
used university students it may be possible that some students may have been only 17- 
years-old and not representative of the legal age to be a juror. In addition, university 
students are not legally obligated for Jury duty. Finally, because many conditions existed 
within the two experiments it resulted in a low subject count for each condition. 
Therefore, the results may not be representative of an actual environment.
The present study only involved individual judgments which may not be 
consistent with the actual verdict reached after jury deliberations. It may be a possibility 
that in a group context the verdicts will change and any individual differences and 
variables that may have had an influence could diminish or enhance (e.g., MacCoim & 
Kerr, 1988).
The time spent to complete the experiments was shorter than a normal adversary 
proceeding and the arguments made by the prosecution and defense in this study most 
closely resembled that o f closing arguments. This is not representative of an actual court 
proceeding where opening statements and evidence are also presented. For future 
research it would be valuable to imitate an actual court proceeding where opening 
statements, closing statement, and the evidence are presented, hi addition, some 
statements in the expert testimonies presented in this study were fiction. For future 
research it may be important to deliver real-life expert testimonies, therefore eliminating 
any subjects which may distrust the testimonies and revert to other factors associated 
with the arguments. For future research, it would also be valuable to use different court 
cases. Both cases used in this study resembled that of other cases used injury decision­
making and may possibly have been familiar to some participants either from reading
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material on juries or associating the material with publicized trials.
A few times throughout this paper I have referenced Silzer and Clark (1977) who 
have suggested the underlying concept of the judicial system, where the burden of proof 
lies with the prosecution and not the defense, may be an explanation for the influence of 
the strength of the prosecution’s arguments on juror’s decision-making. In a court of law it 
has been suggested that these are generally accepted principles where an individual is 
innocent until proven guilty. However, it would have been valuable to include jury 
instructions where these principles are made evident. This hmitation, which should be 
corrected in future studies, may provide valuable insight into the influence on juror 
decision-making.
As mentioned previously, the non existence of the culpability scale in Experiment 
2 may have inhibited the predictive value of the five predictor variables resulting in 
reduced interactions. For future research it would be valuable to include this measure.
For future research it may be also valuable to look at the different styles of 
arguments that the prosecution and defense present. For example, the Pennington & Hastie 
Story Model suggests that when the arguments are presented in a story-like format jurors 
are more likely to find the best fit between the story and the various verdicts. Therefore, it 
may be possible that the style in which the arguments are presented and not the strength of 
the arguments is the primary influential factor in which jurors base their judgments. 
Conclusions
The findings fi-om the present research suggest that there are a variety of factors 
that influence juror decision-making. The primary influential factor was the strength of 
the prosecution’s argument. These results are consistent with previous research and
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suggest that arguments made by the prosecution should consist of strong reasoning and 
strong evidence in order to influence juror decision-making.
Although, research has indicated that only a small percentage of cases proceed to 
trial-by-Jury (approximately only 10% in North America; Gold, 2002) it is important to 
note that the decisions rendered can have significant consequences on the lives involved. 
It is therefore very important that each Juror have the ability and motivation to withstand 
the rigorous task of comprehending all the information presented in court. The need for 
cognition scale provides a reliable measure o f motivation and may be valuable in 
selecting jurors more capable of processing the arguments. Recently, a 3-item need for 
cognition scale was developed and found to be reliable (Williams-Piehota, Schneider, 
Pizarro, Mowad, & Salovey, in press 2003). It would be worthwhile to examine the 
implications of this scale in the process used to select candidates for jury duty.
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Appendix A 
Case Summary
Adams (the defendant) and Zemp have been close friends for years. Recently they 
began to gamble heavily together and, as matters became involved, met at a tavern to 
discuss their relationship. After a period of conversation Zemp knocked Adams to the 
floor and threw an object in his direction. Adams responded by stabbing Zemp in the 
stomach with a piece o f glass.
The law provides that it is unlawful to use more force in repelling an attack than a 
person believes necessary or than a reasonable person would believe necessary in the 
same or similar circumstances.
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Appendix B
Prosecution and Defense Weak and Strong Arguments 
Prosecution Weak Argument. You the jury should find the defendant (Adams) 
guilty as charged. As I have proven to you in this court of law, and of which I will 
remind you, the defendant did not stab his friend (Zemp) in self-defense. The defendant 
entered the tavern and explicitly asked the waitress that he and Zemp were not to be 
disturbed while in the private room. The defendant then proceeded to the private room, 
where Zemp was waiting for him, and closed the door. As we heard the first witness (a 
customer at the tavern) states he heard shouting coming from the private room. In 
addition, the second witness (the waiter from the tavern) also heard a loud conversation 
coming from the private room. The waiter, however, took the initiative of opening the 
door to the private room, but as soon as he did so, the defendant (Adams) told him to stay 
out. Let me remind you also, that the defendant (Adams) did not call for help when Zemp 
threw an object in his direction. As a result of the stabbing, my client (Zemp) was 
hospitalized for 5 weeks and will never be able to work again as a longshoreman. And 
due to this he was unable to find work for 2 weeks after leaving the hospital.
I ask you, the jury, to make the right decision and find the defendant (Adams) guilty as 
charged.
Prosecution Strong Argument. In this court, I have shown that beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the defendant (Adams) is guilty as charged, and did not stab his fiiend 
in self-defense. In this closing statement I will remind you of the evidence and facts that 
have already been shown to you in court, which prove that the defendant is in fact guilty. 
Our first witness, who took the stand under oath earlier, is a waiter at the tavern in which
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the stabbing took place, and was working at the time in which the incident occurred. As 
he stated earlier, he heard the defendant in the private room fall to the floor, and scream 
to Zemp, in these exact words, "I ought to kill you for that". Now I will remind you that 
as you can see for yourself, and as the defendant himself stated, he was not in any way 
injured when Zemp knocked him to the floor. It was then, after this minor incident, that 
the event took place and the defendant stabbed the victim (Zemp) with a piece of glass.
At that time, the defendant lunged at Zemp with a piece of broken glass, yet Zemp did 
nothing to defend himself, not even struggle to get the piece of glass out of the 
defendant's hand. And not only did the defendant stab Zemp once with the broken glass, 
but twice. At this time, let me remind you, that the defendant does have the honor of 
holding a black belt, which is awarded to those with high proficiency in karate.
After the stabbing had taken place, the defendant ran out the back door of the tavern, 
leaving his so-called "friend" behind. After the incident took place, Zemp was 
hospitalized for a period of time and was in poor health for several months following the 
stabbing, leaving him in an obvious weakened condition. Now, does this not seem like a 
guilty man to you? So I ask you in this courtroom today, to find justice in this case, and 
find the defendant guilty.
Defence Weak Argument. My client, the defendant (Adams), is not guilty as 
charged. As I have proven to you in this court of law, and of which I will remind you, as 
the facts stand you the jury cannot indict my client. The defendant (Adams) is not guilty. 
When the defendant (Adams) arrived at the tavern he found Zemp waiting for him in a 
room at the rear of the tavern that was usually reserved for private parties. The defendant 
entered the room and started the meeting. During the meeting the defendant (Adams) told
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Zemp they should end their relationship before serious trouble developed between them. 
Zemp then raised his fist and swore loudly at the defendant during the discussion. Let me 
remind you that Zemp has been a lightweight boxing champion of the First Marine 
Division, and is therefore known to have strength. As well, as we heard from Zemps’ 
gambling associates, Zemp had a reputation as a "poor loser". Let me also remind you 
that my client, the defendant (Adams), is somewhat nearsighted and wore glasses the 
night of the incident; indicating that his vision may have been blurred. My client has also 
never been known to have carried a gun or knife in his life. You, the jury, do not have 
any reason to indict my client. The defendant (Adams) is not guilty as charged.
Defense Strong Argument. In this court, I have shown you evidence that proves 
the defendant (Adams) had only the intention to defend himself against Zemp, and not to 
commit any such act of which he is being accused in this court, hi this closing statement I 
will remind you of the evidence and facts that have already been shown to you in court, 
which proves that there is much doubt in the prosecutions case, and that the defendant is 
not guilty. As witnesses have stated earlier, Zemp has a well-established reputation for 
getting into fights and heated arguments. This is not the first time in which Zemp has 
been in this sort of fight. It has also been shown that Zemp usually carries a weapon on 
him, and the defendant, being his friend, was well aware of this fact. A witness also 
stated, who is a fiiend of both Zemp and the defendant, that before the defendant had met 
Zemp at the tavern where this incident occurred, the defendant had told the witness that 
he had hoped that he could settle the dispute between him in Zemp at this meeting. He 
also said that he hoped it could be settled peacefully and in a fiiendly manner, because 
after all, they were fiiends. Now, once at the tavern and in the private room, Zemp and
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the defendant began their discussion. Another witness, that was on the stand earlier, 
stated that he was a customer at the tavern on the date and time when the incident took 
place. He was seated near the private room that Zemp and the defendant occupied and 
could hear much of the conversation. One part of the conversation he heard quite clearly 
was the defendant telling Zemp to "calm down". As the defendant told us earlier, once the 
argument grew heated, the defendant was the one who turned away from Zemp and 
walked towards the other side of the room, wanting the argument to cool down. Now, 
after the stabbing took place, the defendant was worried about his friend and tried to stop 
the bleeding of his wound. Another witness, who is a waiter at the tavern and was 
working at the time of the incident, stated on the stand that he had entered the private 
room after the stabbing and had witnessed the defendant trying to stop the bleeding.
Also, as the police reports show, the defendant made a full statement to the police 
regarding the incident directly after the incident took place, even though he was in no 
way required to do so. Now does this sound like a man who would really want to hurt his 
own friend? So I ask you in this courtroom today, to find justice in this case, and find the 
defendant not guilty.
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Appendix C 
Verdict
In the case you have just read about, how do you find the defendant? (Please circle only 
one answer)
GUILTY NOT GUILTY
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Appendix D 
Verdict Scale
Because some people may find it difficult to decide guilt or innocence on a two- 
point scale, how would rate the defendant on a scale of 1 to 7 (“1” being “Not guilty at 
all” and “7” being “Completely guilty”)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Completely
guilty guilty
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Appendix E 
Need for Cognition Scale 
Write in the number that best fits your view:
1 2 3 4
completely mostly mostly completely
false false true true
1. I would prefer conplex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
_3. Thinking is not my idea o f fun.
_4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge 
my thinking abilities.
_5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth 
about something.
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11.1 really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
13.1 prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15.1 would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought.
16.1 feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requhed a lot of mental effort.
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.
18.1 usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
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Appendix F 
Criminal Case
Mr. Grady Robertson was a happily married man of seven years. He was a 
computer analyst with B.C. Corp and had a consistent work schedule of 9am to 5pm 
Monday to Friday with a one-hour lunch break from 12pm to 1pm.
On Wednesday November 13, 2002 at approximately 4:30pm Mr. Robertson 
received a phone call at work from the RCMP telling him that they needed him to 
identify his wife’s body. His wife and another man were found murdered in a rented 
room at “Murdock’s Motel” which is located near a major highway. This was a motel 
frequented by transients and prostitutes. Upon arrival at the scene, forensic experts 
reported that Mrs. Robertson and her companion were murdered with a steak knife; they 
each had numerous deep stab wounds to the chest. Mr. Robertson is now being tried in 
the Supreme Court of British Columbia for murder in the first degree on both counts.
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Appendix G
Criminal Case Arguments for the Prosecution and Defense 
Prosecution Weak Argument. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I have full 
confidence that you will make the right decision today by finding the defendant, Mr. 
Robertson, guilty of murdering his wife and her companion. To begin, I would like to tell 
you about Mr. Robertson’s work schedule, specifically his lunch hour. Mr. Robertson has 
a full hour for lunch from 12pm to 1pm, indicating he had plenty of time to commit 
murder. In addition, Mr. Robertson’s employers stated that he was very aggressive that 
specific day. Police also stated that they found black leather gloves in the trunk of Mr. 
Robertson’s car. Mr. Robertson’s neighbours reported to the police that they heard Mr. & 
Mrs. Robertson arguing that morning. As well, Mr. Robertson had a doctor’s appointment 
that day which he cancelled. A few weeks prior to the murders, Mr. Robertson had 
confided in a close friend that he was having marriage problems. And to make matters 
worse Mr. Robertson’s parents were supposed to come visit them that weekend but Mr. 
Robertson cancelled the visit that day. Having stated all these points, ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury I know you will agree with me when I tell you that Mr. Robertson 
is guilty of murder. You will now hear from our expert witness who will testify to the 
same point.
Prosecution Strong Argument. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I have full 
confidence that you will make the right decision today and find the defendant, Mr. 
Robertson, guilty of murdering his wife and her companion. Let be begin by talking 
about Mr. Robertson’s alibi on that horrendous day. Mr. Robertson stated that he had 
lunch with a friend for 30 minutes of his break; however he was unable to give a strong
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alibi for the next 30 minutes. In addition police records indicate that Mr. Robertson was 
20 minutes late returning to work; and his work is timed to be only a 20 minute walk 
from the scene of the crime when walking through the back streets. A few weeks prior to 
the murders, Mr. Robertson confided in a friend that he suspected his wife was cheating 
on him and specifically stated that if  she was cheating on him he would kill her. In 
addition approximately around the same time, Mr. Robertson had taken out $500,000 in 
life insurance on his wife. A couple of weeks prior to the murders, Mrs. Robertson 
admitted herself into the hospital for severe bruises where she confessed to the on-call 
nurse that her husband had hit her. Police reports also indicate that Mr. Robertson had 
two knife wounds in his left hand from a steak knife that same day. At the scene of the 
crime investigators reported that Mrs. Robertson was found to have skin fragments under 
her finger nails matching that of her husbands Mr. Robertson. In addition, Mr.
Robertson’s hair was found at the scene of the crime. Having stated all these points ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury I know you will agree with me when I tell you that Mr. 
Robertson is guilty of murder. You will now hear from our expert witness who will 
testify to the same point.
Defence Weak Argument. Ladies and gentleman of the jury, today I will be 
presenting to you the case of my client Mr. Grady Robertson and providing proof of his 
innocence. I know you the jury will come to the right decision and set my client free so 
that he may mourn the death of his wife in peace. Mr. Robertson has already clarified his 
whereabouts on that specific day. During his lunch hour Mr. Robertson went for a walk 
and bumped into a friend on his way back to work. During his morning break Mr. 
Robertson bought a beautiful bracelet for his wife to surprise her. A few days prior to the
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murders, Mr. Robertson confided in a friend that he loved his wife and would never hurt 
her regardless of how she hurt him. In addition, Mr. Robertson had a romantic vacation 
set up for that up coming weekend for his wife and himself. When asked to identify the 
body of his wife, Mr. Robertson acted like any normal person would; he was shocked, 
heartbroken and confused. As hurt as Mr. Robertson was to find out about his wife’s 
death in a hotel room with another man, he still took care of the funeral arrangements and 
provided the best ceremony possible for their family and friends. Now ladies and 
gentlemen, you will agree with me when I say that my client Mr. Robertson is NOT 
guilty. This man has done nothing but good for his wife. You will now hear from our 
expert witness who will testify to the same point.
Defence Strong Argument. Ladies and gentleman of the jury, today I will be 
presenting to you the case of my client Mr. Grady Robertson and providing proof of his 
innocence. I know you the jury will come to the right decision and set my client free so 
that he may mourn the death of his wife in peace. On that horrendous day Mr.
Robertson’s car was parked in his usual spot in the employee garage all day. Police 
reports indicate his car did not move. In addition, Mr. Robertson’s doctor has testified 
that Mr. Robertson has knee problems and is therefore unable to walk fast and definitely 
not for an hour; thus indicating he would never have been able to reach the motel, 
complete the murder and return to work during his lunch hour. Mr. Robertson told police 
that he went for a quick lunch with a friend where he ate a steak and accidentally cut his 
left hand. Mr. Robertson then decided to go for a short walk to digest; while on his walk 
Mr. Robertson bumped into an old friend and had a lengthy conversation. A few weeks 
prior to the murders Mrs. Robertson talked to Mr. Robertson about taking out $500,000
Primacy and Recency 72
life insurance on each other for their own safety. Mr. Robertson did not want to but 
agreed in case something happened to him; he would be comforted knowing his wife was 
taken care of. Mr. & Mrs. Robertson had been seeing a marriage counselor for months 
before the murders. The marriage counselor testified that the couple was progressing and 
had no indications of any problems. In addition, the counselor also testified that she had 
individual sessions with Mr. & Mrs. Robertson, and neither ever indicated that they were 
cheating on each other or had suspected the other person cheating. On that specific day, 
Mr. Robertson’s secretary stated that Mrs. Robertson had called earlier that morning and 
seemed very cheerful and excited to speak to her husband; thus indicating that their 
relationship was in good spirits as other fiiends had already indicated. Finally, forensic 
scientists have reported the stab wounds to be deep and very forceful. They also reported 
that the person must have been at least 6 feet tall and very muscular. This indicates that 
the killer is not Mr. Robertson due to his small physique. Ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury, having said all this I know you will come to the right conclusion and set my client 
fi-ee. You will now hear from our expert witness who will testify to the same point.
Primacy and Recency 73
Appendix H
Criminal Case Expert Testimonies for the Prosecution and Defense 
Prosecution Expert Testimony
Credentials: Mr. Matthew Irvine is a forensic scientist who is specialized in DNA testing 
and has extensive experience in working with the RCMP.
Simple Testimony. DNA is material that governs inheritance of eye color, hair 
color, stature, bone density and many other human traits. In my opinion it is obvious that 
Mr. Robertson killed his wife and the other man. A strand of hair was found at the scene 
of the crime and it did not belong to Mrs. Robertson or her companion. Our DNA tests 
show that the hair particle belongs to Mr. Robertson. In addition, Mrs. Robertson had 
skin fragments underneath her fingernails, indicating that she may have scratched an 
individual in a struggle. Again, our DNA tests show that the skin fragments match that of 
Mr. Robertson. In my opinion, it is very possible that Mr. Robertson was at the scene of 
the crime.
Complex Testimony. In our full service serology laboratory we routinely perform 
lEF electrophoresis and DNA analysis with our Analytic Genetic Programs which run the 
DNA synthesizer. It is there where we acknowledged the fact, by completing a gene 
expression REP analysis, that the hair particle disclosed at the crime scene, by using the 
Universal Block Transfer, was that of Mr. Robertson. In addition, with the help of a 
molecular genetics, traces of immunoelectrophoresis fragments were found, by using a 
purified immunoglobulin, from underneath Mrs. Robertson’s fingernails. In addition, we 
also ran the epithelial cells through the Anitserm Immuno Program where traces of the 
antibodies detected P30 crossover. This indicates that we are unable to exclude Mr.
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Robertson as the donor of the sample.
Defence Expert Testimony
Credentials: Mr. James McDonald is a forensic scientist who specializes in DNA testing 
and has extensive experience in working with the RCMP.
Simple Testimony. It is in my opinion that Mr. Robertson should not be 
convicted for the crime based on the arguments provided by the prosecution. Although a 
hair particle was found at the scene of the crime and experts have clearly stated it to be 
that of Mr. Robertson’s, we can not make the assumption that Mr. Robertson was at the 
crime scene. This is due to the fact that Mr. & Mrs. Robertson share a bed, wash their 
clothes together and physically live together. There is a 99% chance that Mrs. Robertson 
carries particles (i.e., hair, skin, etc.) of Mr. Robertson with her and vice versa. Therefore, 
there is a .004% probability that Mr. Robertson was actually at the scene of the crime. 
That is a 1 in 1,000,000,000 chance. In my opinion, there is no hard evidence to convict 
this man.
Complex Testimony. Detecting alleles under certain circumstances is a 
theoretical possibility and was demonstrated by using DQ alpha. However, in theory, the 
loss of statistical significance of alleles is due to what is called the "stochastic effect". In 
addition to the stochastic effect, a PGR phenomenon called "differential amplification" 
may play a role when DNA evidence is said to be found. Therefore the discovery of Hae 
III enzyme particles at the crime scene can be very misleading due to the fact that the 
human organisms (i.e., Mr. & Mrs. Robertson) co-habitat and co-mingle their garments. 
Therefore, it is in my opinion that the DNA evidence exposed is extensively degraded.
In addition, using the DNA-array experiment and a data format ~ Microarray Markup
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Lane (MAML) — for communicating this information where MAML is based on the 
Extensible Markup Lane XML, the statistical significance of probability that Mr. 
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